
**CARTOGRAPHIES IN CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE BORDER
NARRATIVES OF INDIA AND CHINA**

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Article Received: 06 December 2025

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Article Revised: 26 December 2025

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Published on: 14 January 2026

DOI: <https://doi-doi.org/101555/ijrpa.4628>

INTRODUCTION:

In the immediate aftermath of India's independence in 1947, the seeds of the India–China border dispute were already present, rooted in colonial-era boundary arrangements that China never accepted. The eastern sector was defined by the *McMahon Line*, drawn during the 1914 Simla Convention between British India and Tibet, but rejected by China. In the west, the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India in October 1947 introduced complexities over Aksai Chin. Thus, when India became independent, it inherited ambiguous frontiers: China did not recognize the McMahon Line, and the western boundary was unsettled. These unresolved issues hardened after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, setting the stage for decades of contestation that escalated into the 1962 war.

India China border dispute, still rests with inherited unresolved and unclear demarcated border, with a stretch of 3488-km with no mutually accepted LAC. India post-independence strongly relied and depended upon the boundary demarcations done by the British. But it was completely in contrast with what China believed, according to China Britain left an undetermined disputed legacy of a border between two new born states, i.e. India and China. The disputed border is divided into three main sectors, western, middle and eastern sectors. The western boundary refers to the Johnson Line offered by the British government in 1860 that stretches up to Kunlun Mountains and couch Aksai Chin in the then princely state of Jammu and Kashmir After independence India endured the inherited demarcations given by the British and hence included Aksai Chin as an Indian territory. A noteworthy and an arguable point that China ab initio did not objected on India's status in the early 1950s but it gradually started to shift its instance in the following years, eventually it reseeded its position

on the same and declared that it had never assented to this demarcation and hence could not find it justifiable to cede Aksai Chin to India. Out of all the three sectors only the middle sector have minor disputes, because the eastern sector has a lot of dissonance over the McMahon Line and forms the significant part of the disputed region. 3rd July, 1914, officials from British India, China and Tibet met in Shimla to resolve the border dispute, although Chinese officials initialled the agreement but in later phase reversed from this agreement.

Echoes of the Past:

It was Simla convention in 1914, wherein the birth of McMahon line took place, India and Tibet signed the accord which declared McMahon Line to be the dividing line for Tibet from India in the eastern sector. Even though the agreement accepted that the Tibet forms a part of China, the Chinese officials did not agree to the conventions layout as they held contrast views on Article 9 of the said agreement which defined the border between Inner and Outer Tibet, A significant observation here could be made that except Article 9, of the convention China did not have any remonstrance for any other article, even the Article which defined McMahon Line. After the Simla Convention of July 3rd, 1914, China got ample opportunities to object on McMahon Line but it was only on 23rd January 1959 when PM Zhou intimated through a letter to PM Nehru. The contents of the letter were emphasizing that:

- 1) The India and China border had never been officially defined and delimited and there is no treaty or agreement that exists regarding the same issue between both the countries.
- 2) McMahon Line does not have any relevance in the current situation as China considers it to be a British legacy and product, moreover China believes it to be the policy of British aggression against the Tibet region of China.
- 3) Although PM Zhou accepted that Tibetans had signed the convention but they were quiet disgruntled upon the ‘unilaterally drawn’ line.
- 4) China is bound to take a realistic approach to McMahon Line.

PM Zhou further gave a detailed view point of China in his letter dated on 8th September 1959:

“The much discussed McMahon Line was never mentioned at the Shimla Conference, but was confirmed by the British officials and the officials of the Tibet local government officials secretly at the back of the officials of the Chinese Central Government by

atrade-off, of the secret papers at New Delhi on March 24, 1914, that is, before the signing of the Shimla treaty. This bone of contention line was later drawn on the map that was with the Shimla treaty as part of the boundary line between Tibet and the rest of China. This much debated McMahon Line was a result of the British policy of hostility against the Tibet area of China and has never been determined by any Chinese Central Government and is therefore considered as illegal. As according to the Shimla treaty, it was not officially signed by the officials of the then Chinese Central Government, and hence this was overtly pointed out in the treaty. Even after that for a long time after the trade-off, of secret papers between Britain and the Tibet local officials, Britain never made it public the related documents, nor ever changed the conventional way making this section of the boundary on maps”.

In the Simla convention Ivan Chen participated as Chinese delegate, he had a full involvement throughout the convention with an equal footing with his Tibetan counterpart. The agendas and the issues to be discussed in the convention was fully known to the Chinese, the convention was arranged with complete acceptance from the Chinese officials, even the then Chinese foreign minister intimated the British government regarding their presence in the convention to participate in the joint treaty with their Tibetan and British counterparts. Tibet was given equal ground by the Chinese to officially exchange and acknowledge the credentials of its Chinese and British counterparts. Moreover, on June 13th 1913, Tibet to be an administered region of China, an order, which was brought out by Chinese President Yuan Shih-Kai on April 21st 1912, was revoked to underline the cause of the convention. China was fully aware of the subject of the convention, it was the borders of India and Tibet were to be discussed and Ivan Chen the Chinese representative not in the convention neither afterwards no objections were raised about the matter.

After a long discussion between British-India and Tibet government regarding the Indo-Tibet border during January 15th to January 31st 1914, they came out with a full detailed boundary limitations for both India and Tibet on February 17th 1914 accompanied by a map, which declared the frontiers of Tibet, later named as McMahon Line. Until now there was no dissonance from the Chinese side. The outcome of the series of discussions between India and Tibet resulted in an agreement between McMahon and Lonchen Shatra. The final draft of Indo-Tibet border was finally submitted before all the delegates on April 22nd 1914. However,

on April 26th 1914 through Ivan Chen, China officially declared its stand on the subject and communicated. The excerpts of the letter are as follows:

“After the omission of Article 9 of the draft convention, Chinese were ready to take the main principles, included in the other articles, with the willing acceptance. And just before the signing of the Shimla Convention on 3 July 1914 by the British and Tibetan officials, the Chinese, once again, iterated and said as follows:

The Chinese government has many times conveyed that it gives its full acceptance to the most of the part of the articles of the Convention. The part it is not agreeing is that involved with the question of the boundary”.

Therefore it is quite clear that nothing was done, about which China was not knowing, and hence it goes contrary to the Zhou's claim that China was kept in the dark about the onset of the negotiations. The agreement was duly signed (full signature) by the Tibetan Plenipotentiary Lonchen Shatra and Paljor Dorje, the two maps presented on 27th April and 3rd July 1914, depicting India and Tibet border contains the full signatures of the Tibetan diplomat, the map of 27th April 1914 contains the full signatures of Ivan Chen and McMahon's initials were there on the same map of 27th April 1914 and on the convention of 3rd July 1914, although he signed his full signature in the map with the convention agreement presented on 3rd July 1914. In an effort to bring China in to an alignment to the Simla accord British government officially informed China on June 25th 1914:

In a situation wherein China does not sign the convention before the end of the month in such case HMG (His Majesty's Government) stands free to sign the agreement separately with Tibet.

A similar information was shared on August 8th 1914 by British Foreign Office to the Chinese Ambassador:

China's acceptance to the matter is not necessary for the actualization of Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 3rd July 1914 and it is also not mandatory for the boundary agreement of March 25th 1914 to be legal.

Therefore it cannot be said that China was kept in dark and the agreement was done covertly. As British government was informing their Chinese counterpart regarding the convention on regular basis. However, there were certain points of objections made from the Chinese side but no questions were raised regarding the McMahon Line.

- 1) There was a telegram made from the Chinese Foreign Office on April 20 and 25, 1914.
- 2) China send an explanatory map along with a memoranda stating that the red line persists unchanged, a yellow line depicts the partition line as earlier claimed by China, while a brown line determinesthe compromise it now offered.
- 3) July 6th 1914, Chinese delegate informed the British representative in Peking that it was only the issue of boundary that has precluded the agreement.
- 4) In October 1914, Chinese delegate Wai Chiao, repeated and stated that it is only the boundary case, otherwise the whole Simla Convention is accepted.

DP Choudhary in his book *The Northeast Frontier of India-1865-1914*, tries to constitute that China although disowned the initial of Ivan Chen in the convention, but it did not keep any territorial demand south of McMahon Line.

A new proposal was made by the Chinese June 13th 1914, regarding the issue of inner and outer Tibet boundary, but there was no citation or reference of India and Tibet boundary. However, in 1919, China came out with new demands for alterations in the Simla Convention, the reference was made to inner and outer Tibet and inner Tibet and China but again there was no address regarding India-Tibet border, McMahon Line. In the official China year book of 1921-22, they published about the Anglo-Chinese dialogues and negotiations regarding Tibet but they did not stated anything about McMahon Line or any kind of emerging dispute over the same. It was only in the year 1959, when China woke up and started challenging officially and creating dispute over the McMahon Line, this is a proven record even in international law.

China has always made an effort to show its high morality grounds and to portray itself as a victim, they also prefer to demonstrate their growth and rise as benign. China considers its rise as mutually liberal. But what they persistently conveys from their behaviour is an utterly belligerent and assertive attitude. China's expansion theory, predatory economy and denial of international laws have rather become a practice.

Infrastructural Preparedness a comparative study

3,348 km, India China border can be described by highly rugged and sturdy mountains, with extremely harsh weather conditions forming parts of Jammu Kashmir, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. The altitude ranges between 9,000 ft to 19,000 ft, because of this freezing temperature and height the region is scarce in vegetation. Since the region is having less or no

vegetation at all, motor vehicular movement is not restricted in the available roads there. A very limited cross country transport is viable in this part. After India's independence, there was a challenge of fixing up of 15,000 km long border, the distance and the spread of the northern and north-eastern border region paired with insufficient road connectivity and network, demanded for starting up of an organisation which could provide timely and quality infrastructure along the border. It was considered that Public Works Department (PWDs) did not have in its capacity to build large scale infrastructure projects on border, some other organisation under central government should be formed for infrastructural developments at the borders. To meet the border roads requirements Border Roads Development Board (BRDB) was formed in 1960 under the central ministry, whose first Chairman was PM Jawaharlal Nehru. The major task of BRDB was to deliver fast, standardized and economical constructions of roads and their network, primarily improving the already surviving roads and secondly building new roads.

The Politics of Limitation: The main function of the BRDB is significant for proper and time bound building of roads, this is the organisation which plays the most pivotal role for aligning all the other government agencies relating to infrastructural requirements. Post-independence it was headed by the Prime Minister, currently the position is headed by defence minister for state and common operations are being looked after by a joint secretary level officer. According to some past observations it is because of the current structuring that requisite officer and their subordinates do not know the requirements and priorities, that makes hampers the decision making process and hence results in unnecessary delays. The interference on the part of Internal Financial Advisor (IFA) into the technical aspects of infrastructural projects also leads to scarcity of funds. Approval of the projects includes the requirements faced by the user, estimation of costs and time required, generally it takes 15 to 18 months, however errors and inconsistencies may create delays in the approval. The distance, location and the harshness of the climate sometimes poses unnecessary delays into the work moreover work also gets delayed if strictly procedures are followed.

How much strategic and concern India is about its border and its safety, it has to be interpreted realistically, as we are still pursuing the primitive labour intensive construction practice, every year a huge number of casual workers are hired for construction work, with comparatively primitive equipment, which results in less productivity and delayed work. Mediocracy, low productivity delayed projects, obstacles due to harsh weather conditions,

logistic supply and lack of administrative will results in poor conditions of the border infrastructure. For example if we compare, the building time for about 138 km long road in Ladakh was approved for five years and it got delayed for two years increasing the time frame to seven years, in comparison a private company construct an 80 km road in two years with advance techniques and equipment, the important thing is what are the priorities and determinants for safeguarding the borders. Another important aspect is the role played by the state and local organisations, local government is primarily responsible for all kinds of clearances for fast development of roads. Sometimes projects gets delayed due to unavailability of forests and wildlife clearances, due to rigorous norms proclaimed by the concerned ministries. Although a time frame of 210 days has been stipulated by the Ministry of Environment and Forests but this practice is generally not followed. Many times the distribution of construction material is not released because no timely allotment of the quarry site has been done by the government agencies and reason being environmental concerns and regulations devised by the court of law

Border Narratives in Contrast: Due to the illusionary perception of the LAC, as it is not boldly demarcated neither on the land nor on the military maps, which in itself interprets the depth of complexities of this matter. Moreover the rigid position adopted on this subject is also a matter of grave concern. India and China for both LAC is a matter of perception, and understanding this perception is very important because a slight wrong move could result into crucial situations. The main contesting part between the perceived lines of actual control is called the no man's land or the red zone which is actually forming the bone of contention between both the countries. This is the region which bears all sought of military face offs. However except *SumdorongChu* valley-the *Wangdung* incident of 1987, no serious incident of firing has taken place after the *NathuLa* incident of 1967. The contrast between India and China in managing their border infrastructure is that on the Chinese side they have a single entity to look after and manage the border infrastructure issues i.e. Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) forces but on the Indian side it is managed by various different organisations including army, Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and Assam Rifles so the numerosity of controlling organisations makes it difficult to endure and manage the border infrastructure and hence it suffers backlogs, moreover at some places even Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) via ITBP and in some other cases Ministry of Defence (MOD) are in charge. The multiplicity of the agencies, perhaps makes the work less accountable which results into unnecessary delays and less productive work. A significant

aspect of border infrastructure development is that it has both positive and negative impact, if we measure positive avenues then it accounts for border connectivity, better economic and trade linkages, communication etc. on the negative side it can arouse suspicion among the neighbouring countries. China has been extremely rigorous in developing and maintaining its borders very efficiently. China has incorporated its borders with all sort of modern and advance amenities required in adverse situation. Looking into Indo-China border disputes, the Indo-China borders are quite vulnerable and susceptible to any kind of conflict, knowing this fact China is strategically planned and organised in its infrastructural developments at the borders. The three main highways i.e. the western, central and eastern in the TAR region is mainly noticeable because of its maintenance facilities and robust design and engineering. The study of the western highway depicts that a 490 km of road has been tarred running through *Lhasa* to *LhatseDz* the coating of tarred road continue till *Parkha* i.e. 510 km. The eastern sector have a similar story where tarring is done through *Lhasa* to *Ngiti* and that is approximately 400 km stretch. In the central division a 90 km four lane road is built between *Lhasa* to *Yangbajain*. China is highly strategic and upgraded in its railway ventures also, 1142 km long electrified railway line has been laid from *Golmud* to *Lhasa* further moving through *Shigatze* and *Yatung* to reach *Nathu La* pass. China's strategic move is taking it nearer to Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh as it is planning to expand and continue the *Golmud-Lhasa* line up to *Nyingchi* and then terminating it in *Dali* in *Yunnan*.

This railway facility which is snaking down parallel to Arunachal Pradesh will facilitate China to move its military fast from *Kunming*, *Dali* and *Kaiyuanand* to TAR, not only this will also provide the railway service to the 13 group army (Unit 56005) to move rapidly from *Sichuan* to TAR. An incredible achievement on China's part as this robust railway track has a capacity to run up to eight trains every day, further to this it has also lessen the travel time to reach *Lhasa* from mainland China, it also bears a tonnage capacity of 3200 tonnes per train. China's infrastructural success story continuous with air bases in Tibet and South China, laying of oil pipelines from *Gormo* to *Lhasa*, it nearly meet the requirement in the TAR region of about 1.25 million tonnes every year. Over the years China's strategic motive to connect China and Pakistan through the Karakoram Highway (KKH) has been ultimately completed with the restoration of this linking road which has a significant strategic value for both these countries. This road extends from *Kashgar* in *Xinjiang* to *Havelian* in *Abbottabad* in *Pakistan* with an approximate stretch of 1300 km. China have further plans to introduce

more railway networks beyond KKH in (PoK) so as for better connectivity, also it facilitates energy supply route from Persian Gulf to Xinjiang province in China.

For better understanding a comparative study of India and China border roads is presented below:

Western Sector

	Chinese Roads:	Indian Roads:
Western Sector	Chip Chap Trig Heights; 04 km on Indian side of LAC	Up to Indian perception of LAC (local road)
	Mabdola-Kongka La; 500 m short of LAC	Just short of Kongka La
	Sirijap – Pt. 4576; 4.5 km on our side of LAC	Nanglung Lungpa 15 km (being extended to Pt. 4433)
	Chutichangla – Area Bush; 100 m inside our perception of LAC	Pt. 4715 02 km
	Setting Imisla; 50 m short of Imisla Pass	Zursar 10 km

Source: Observer Research Foundation

The following data above reveals the status of infrastructural build ups on Chinese and Indian side of the border. The information shared here depicts a steep difference between both the countries. Our neighbouring country China has roads and infrastructure up to the LAC, and even in some cases even beyond the Indian side, while India is still struggling to reach up to its own perceived mark of LAC. The role of well-built infrastructure on the borders of a country have significant importance especially in providing a country to operate its military power. It is noteworthy to mention here that there exists a sharp military asymmetry, on the border with respect to technology, equipment, forces and infrastructure. The major upgradations, proper management and new developments by China provides about 40,000km road network and 1,142 km railway connectivity in Tibet which makes the travel easy between *Lhasa* and *Gormo*. This strategic plan of connectivity throughout this region not only provides China the military benefits but also facilitates trade opportunities and profits.

Middle Sector

Middle Sector Opposite Himanchal	China	India
	Manza-Churup; Churup 03 km short of LAC (construction of road ahead of Churup in progress)	Sugar 04 km

Pradesh	Tayak-Shipki; Shipki 06 km short of LAC (construction of road ahead of Shipki in progress)	Chuppan 05 km
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Source: ORF

Middle Sector:	Bobra-Mana Pass; 01 km short of Mana Pass	Musapani (35 km) (being extended to Ghastoli)
Middle Sector: Opposite Uttarakhal	Lungi-Jindu-Niti; 02 km short of Niti	Malari (50 km)
	Lungi-Tunjun La; Tunjun La up to LAC	KM 16 (33 km)
	Pulan-Lipulekh; 700 m short of Lipulekh	Jibti (80 km) (being extended)
Eastern Sector: Opposite East Sikkim	China Asam-Jhandori Post-Dongchuila; 700 m short of Dongchuila	India TR JUNC 03 km
	Sinchella-Batangla; 75 m short of Batangla	Bheem Base 03 km (being extended to Dokala)
	Sinchella-Dokala; 250 m short of Dokala	Bheem Base 03 km (being extended to Dokala)

Eastern Sector:

Eastern Sector	China Gordong-Broken Hut; 500 m from Gordong Camp	India Nelya 04 km
Eastern Sector: Opposite Tawang	Le Camp – Wangdung; 600 m from Wangdung	Lungrola 03 km
	KechenTso-Kerothang; 500 m from Kerothang	Lungrola 03 km
	Nangdoh-Kharsang La; 200 m from Kharsang La	Sungestar 07 km

Chinese infrastructure in this region also includes 6 air bases and forward airstrips closer to the border. Due to China's calculated and well strategic planning and management their logistic availability and movement of troops in required position is much efficiently done. Whereas, most of the roads terminates before 60 to 80 km before LAC on Indian side of the border, which drastically impacts the troop's movements and deployment, in a crucial situation non availability of the timely and proper logistic supply will tend to affect the course of action. A very valid matter is acclimatization of the deployed troops near the border, in China's case due to better infrastructure the deployment of the troops is much easy, and could easily be established closer to the border, while on Indian side troops are stationed at the Assam plains, which makes it quite difficult when suddenly the troops are send near the border in this case the acclimatization becomes a challenge for them, which may result in a

serious strategic short fall for India in a given situation. The deployment of Chinese troops in Tibet is currently approximately 160,000, but with extremely advanced infrastructure at any given time China has the capacity to mobilise its supplement of 100,000 troops from the central command within a month.

China's incredible air operations, well equipped stationing of heavy duty lift planes in Tibet and the most significantly deployment of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) positioned at Delingha base near Tibet, presents before India the importance of strategic steps. Relatively, the application of China's military power at the borders is much more advanced, strategic and adequate than India's, as the major causes behind India's constrict and naïve attitude is its lack of political will, civil-military administrative dynamics and civilian bureaucracy. Till recent times also India believed that any kind of improvement or development in the border infrastructure would support and provide help to the Chinese troops, however, this perception has changes somehow in recent years. The admission of former Defence Minister A.K. Antony that earlier India believed that the since the border is in remote area and hard to access hence this fact in itself will limit the threats and challenges, with this he also agreed it as a wrong approach. Similarly, BRO Director, Lt. Gen. A.K. Nanda also added that earlier the development of the border roads were unplanned and not "by design" he further added that however our approach has changed in recent years.

An underdeveloped and below standard border infrastructure add on to the miseries to a nation in conflict like situation and perhaps lead to serious consequences, particularly if we see India has already faced challenges in 1962 war. India has taken a very slow and feeble approach for its border infrastructure developments, for an example it takes more than 20 hours to reach *Tawang* from *Guwahati*, due to the miserable condition of the road which is about a distance of 500 km. In 2006 in the cabinet committee on security, government of India it was decided and finally approved, the building of 72 roads and 3 airstrips along with certain other projects that included bridges also to be built in the border areas. This project was planned to provide Indian military a facility to rapidly move its troops into the region and survive there for a longer period of time with sufficient logistic supply in a dire situation Out of 72 roads in the project, till 2010 only nine roads were built, the apparent delay in the project has been imputed to mainly sluggish administrative clearances of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, along with this the inadequacy of workers, funding and machinery

also owes to under development infrastructure. However, Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report of 2010, discloses that a major part of the fund remain unspent.

The condition of road connectivity is deplorable in Sikkim, the road density accounts to approximately 28.50 km per 100 sq km. The infrastructure between Gangtok to Nathu La is inadequate and requires immediate attention as it have only one road connecting the two, the other one is too narrow and accident prone and this road only connects Sikkim with the rest of India. The condition of railway network in the state also requires serious attention. Around more than 61 roads were planned in the project on India-China border, out of which only 15, are made out, and 27, roads are in pipeline to be completed. It is however estimated and found that around 19 roads delayed and not yet completed, due to various factors. A project report says that about 21 tunnels to be built to cover a stretch of about 150 kms but the rate at which this project is being completed is too slow to be made in stipulated time frame. These roads play a very strategic role whether it is on Indian side or Chinese, China aggressively has built its roads, railways and airstrips connectivity to safeguard its borders and for trade objectives, but for India the infrastructural development is still lagging far behind its counterpart, this sluggish and inadequate infrastructural development will not only lower India's capability in crucial hours, but also demonstrate its strategic failure.

Scarcity of raw materials required for construction, shortage of officers, poor quality of labour as well as contractors and insecurity in the region are among the other hurdles that have delayed many of the 24 projects. Moreover, the areas along India's border with China are prone to natural calamities such as cloudbursts, avalanches, landslides and earthquakes, which have further derailed projects. BRO has also been bogged down by red tapism, problems in training of personnel and lengthy and time-consuming land acquisition processes.

SWOT Analysis

Strength:

- ✓ There is an old historical relationship between both the Nations. They were the nerve centers of spiritual and religious activities.
- ✓ India and China both struggled through colonial era in the 19th and 20th centuries. Hence, the meaning of freedom and nationhood are understood by both the nations in perfect sense.

- ✓ Ancient trade links between both the states, evidences of sound relationship in ancient days.
- ✓ Trade and commerce still forms a significant bond between India and China today.

Weakness:

- ✓ China's was not in alignment with India's non-alignment policy, Mao Ze Dong explicitly expressed that a state could either be with imperialist policies or else socialist and other then this nothing else exists.
- ✓ The geographical vastness and strategic situation of China also plays an important role in their relationship.
- ✓ The Tibet issue still disturbs the calm waters.
- ✓ The signing of treaty of *Panchasheel* further shackled India and gave China complete freedom to be belligerent in India's immediate neighborhood.
- ✓ Lack of strategic planning vis-à-vis China on every level from diplomatic, to defence level has always been an area of weakness for India.
- ✓ Lack of infrastructural preparedness even today after decades of 1962 debacle, is surely a major area of concern for India.
- ✓ China's belligerent behavior and its military might are certainly the major concerns which India needs to deal strategically.

Opportunities:

- ✓ Both are Asian nations, with a history of colonial rule and having rich culture and tradition.
- ✓ Good trade relations, through common border.
- ✓ Friendly relations could be maintained through cultural exchanges and sound trade and commerce.

Threats:

- ✓ Pakistan's involvement in India and China dynamics
- ✓ China's invasion of Indian Ocean and the theory of string of pearls.
- ✓ China's salami tactics of territorial expansion.
- ✓ The ceding of Aksai Chin to China by Pakistan.
- ✓ The staple visa issue in Arunachal Pradesh
- ✓ China's increasing defence budget and powerful and well equipped Army.
- ✓ China's mighty and advanced infrastructural development vis-à-vis India.

CONCLUSION

India and China relations rests upon lot of trust deficit since years, particularly post 1962 war as India was defeated badly on its own ground and with its own weak and non-strategic policy failure. PM Nehru's appeasement policy towards China perhaps paved the path to take India as a weak and defending country on the contrary during the 1962, war the same governments approach was intimidating by imposing the "forward policy", and that too when the country was not prepared for any war, with improper and incomplete intelligence reports and with no national security plan in place it clearly proves that Nehru government was never sure of their strategies towards China. Only, with the adhoc and tactical plans the then Nehru government was competing with China who was not only strategically planned from the beginning but was also well prepared. There were not only defence policy making failures during the war but also ample amount of failures on the diplomatic level. Firstly India was completely ignorant about the continuous claims made by China in Aksai Chin until 1950, it was only in 1954 when China purposefully drew India's attention by establishing its claims by publishing maps depicting Aksai Chin as its territory. At this stage instead of keeping silent and avoiding the crisis, had Nehru government chose to diplomatically resolve the issue by sitting across the table with the Chinese and settling the matter, since at this stage neither the border was delineated nor demarcated it would have been a strategic diplomatic win for India.

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